

***PENETRATING THE PERPETUATOR OF TERRORISM: AN ANALYSIS
ON THE MODUS OPERANDI OF AL-QAEDA***

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ABSTRACT

The unprecedented growth of terrorism had made the environment of international peace and security far more complex than in the era of World war and Cold war. By utilizing the features of globalization the terror organizations had gone transnational with its elaborate complicated networks thereby changing the nature of conflict fought so far as these terror organizations as non-state actors tends to challenge the state stability as never before. Further the process of globalization had blurred the distinction between global and regional security because if there is a threat to regional stability then it will have its spillover effects like in the form of refugee, migration crisis and other human right rights issues which became a matter of concern for international community as it threatens the international peace. Therefore in order to devise an efficient and effective counter policy to terrorism it is necessary to understand the perpetrators of terrorism- the terrorist organizations. This paper tends to analyse one of the prominent terror organization Al-Qaeda using the combined aspects of strategic framework and organizational theories that usually explains the decision making process of the organization. In this paper the background events that contributed to the evolution of Al-Qaeda as a organization, its objectives and underlying ideological narrative are discussed in detail. Further the modus operandi of Al-Qaeda are explained in the form of its terror tactics strategies, its organizational features and its revenue and logistics supply methods. Therefore this paper gives the detailed understanding about the working method of Al-Qaeda which helps to understand the policy implications that demands the combination of hard power to contain and soft power to curb it.

KEY WORDS: *Terrorism; Terror organizations; Non-state actors; Transnational; Regional and Global security; Al-Qaeda; strategic framework; organizational theories; modus operandi; terror tactics; organizational features; revenue and logistics; hard power; soft power.*

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of human history violence is often used as a strategy to achieve the objectives. With the emergence of kingdoms and states they monopolized the legitimate use of violence within a given territory under their jurisdiction. When disputes arise between them they often indulge in conflict to sort out their differences whether through direct warfare or conduct siege openly or in its more subtle forms. The WWI and WWII are such catastrophic direct warfare that resulted in huge loss both in human lives and material resources worldwide. Then the end of world wars had paved the way for rise of two superpowers US and USSR who indulge in arms race and making alliances almost divided the world into two camps under their leadership. Though there were high points of tension between US and USSR the establishment of UN had prevented the conflict between the two superpowers from escalating into a direct warfare or another world war that involves the usage of nuclear weapons which may produce disastrous consequences thereby containing the conflict to remain cold between them. But in the process of making alliances to cement their position in international politics and creating strategic military bases to counter each other these superpowers captivating the local resistance emerged to resist the dominance of either one of their dominance in a particular region both the US and USSR had supported and even created some rebel groups and local militias to eliminate each other and assert their dominance in the region. But these strategies after the end of cold war had eventually contributed to the rise and evolution of non-state actors- the terrorist organizations that tend to challenge and threaten the state's status quo and international order.

One such organization that serves as a template for terrorism in the 21st century is the Al-Qaeda which has created a tremendous impact on global security and changed the course of conflict fought so far by adopting terror tactics in a way that the state has never witnessed or experienced before. The 9/11 attack of Al-Qaeda on US had defined the irrevocable shift in the nature of terror tactics and notified the huge threat to international security of greater magnitude that was different from the era of world wars and cold war. As the product born out of unrestrained resistance to occupation of Afghanistan by USSR and the foreign policy of west that are reactionary Al-Qaeda from a local terrorist organization had gone transnational with refined networks and affiliates conducting a series of terror attacks against the interests of west globally. Though Al-Qaeda had faced serious setbacks that involves

from assassination of their leader Osama bin Laden to the challenge posed by the emergence of new terrorist organizations like ISIS, now they strategically reorient and regroup themselves under the leadership of al-Zawahiri, making them a long-term player in conflict-prone areas, particularly in the Middle East. This paper aims to investigate the Al-Qaeda's mode of operation, which helps to understand the threat that it poses to international peace and stability. The first section of the paper contains the literature review that illustrates the debates and major theories in studies about terrorism. Then the paper explains the theoretical framework and research method adopted to conduct the study on terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Then the core part of the paper explains the modus operandi of Al-Qaeda, which aims to answer the following questions:

What are the Al-Qaeda's strategies in their terror tactics?

What are the organizational features that make Al-Qaeda an effective organization?

How are revenue and logistics supply met by Al-Qaeda?

Finally, the paper concludes by discussing the present status of Al-Qaeda and the necessary policy implications to dismantle the organization.

LITERATURE REVIEW- DEBATES AND THEORIES OF TERRORISM

Ranstorp (2009), and Reid (1997) stated that there are different stages in what is commonly called terrorism studies. They consider that, consistent and systematic research can be identified from the works of the 1970s, with Rapoport (1971), Crenshaw (1972), and Gurr (1970). To some point, it is feasible to insist that the main active point of this exploration is the concept of urban guerrilla warfare, that comes from groups' experiences such as the Red Brigades (Italy) and Baader Meinhof (Germany) (Anon., n.d.). Out of the main findings of studies, the one finding insists on terrorism as political behaviour. This idea's propagators insist that a transformation based on qualitative had taken place in terrorism exercise due to the reflection of terrorist attacks such as the explosion of World Trade Centre (1993), Lebanon (1980) and the sarin gas Tokyo metro attacks (1995). With the comparison of 1960s - 1970s terrorism, the current terrorism owns a matrix of religious and cultural aspects. Other than that, they also mention a transformation in technological advance that leads up to a more number of victims. The literature presented with strong investigation up to the end and the conclusions were presented with speculative comments, prescriptions without either empirical bases or

theoretical, and naïve descriptions. Other than that, the all field was fixed, with the identical definitions and hypotheses always accumulated to be assimilated and analysed.

The September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 had led to the growth of new wave of academic production about terrorism. According to Ranstorp estimates that, in 2001, there were 100 peer-reviewed articles published on terrorism and by 2007, the number was raised highly with more than 2,300 citations. Besides, Silke says that, previous to 2001, the term 'terrorism' had been published in the 1,310 books, at the time of June 2008 that count had increased to 2,281 volumes (Anon., n.d.). No strange related to Silke statement, our consideration in the previous 10 years of 9/11 attacks, the only appropriate study that insisted on al-Qaeda were only two journals which they issued in the top articles in the sector ('Political Violence & Terrorism' & 'Studies in Terrorism & Conflict'). The crucial status provided whatever the circumstances appeared to have insisted, particular subject of terrorism and terror organizations had earned extra consideration. Huntington's debatable proposal of the Clash of Civilizations were supported by the frequent application of the 9/11 attacks as a factual evidence of current terrorism, imitating, to various point. Another seemed to relate and known as terrorism with failed states, the causal relationship made by the U.S. government through defence motivation (BUSH, n.d.). At the end, there was an appropriate bunch of studies that implemented various specialized accuracy on the region. Out of these studies, Pape (2005) which explains about suicide terrorism and the works of Piazza which debated the relation between failed states and terrorism are notable works on terrorism (PAPE, n.d.). The strong criticize of increase in greater public interest and financing are produced in literature after September 11 which is more hanged on secondary data sources related to primary data sources. There were some restriction and regulation for literature's focus to certain headings, specifically such as policy-oriented topics, giving intellectual explanation for arguable counterterrorism action inflict by the American government and the liability to handle terrorism as something uncommon and unexpected (JACKSON, n.d.)

In the next stage of terrorism studies the above interesting topics are all in critical evaluation particularly on the terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as nature of terrorism policies considered so far. The conceptual argument about the event of terrorism is consider as a special question among the post-September 11 work. (JACKSON, n.d.)insist that the terrorism definitions are exist no below than 200 distinct in the literature. Silke deduce that terrorism concept is understood from theoretical discussion which only 1.6 percent out of 490

articles published in the period of 1990 to 1999. One clarification for this lacuna stems from the case that debates related to international organization and states definition which various analysts kept on ignoring such arguments by endorsing the definitions of states and international organization that conceive terrorism as violence engaged exclusively by non-state actors (Anon., n.d.). Due to insufficient criteria such statement has very limited analytical purpose to differentiate between various other criminal act and terrorism. According to the Wight path outline, the terrorism investigation is start with its connection with the modern state. According to the author statement, the integration of the state can be recognize as a long path of provision and aggregation— of people, territories, and resources — make through the violence. These monopolizations process success is peaked in the approval of that political entity as the most permissible, but it conceals the reality that it derived from an other ways of non-state violence and that terrorism and violent history were merge to such monopolies. In addition, the debates insisted that terrorism is a iteration of political violence out of many others — genocide, insurgency, war, etc — whose exposure should be realized as the reply to a particular socio-political crisis. So, there is a need to understand the strategic logics to purify the contrast between other forms of political violence and terrorism. This enclose evaluating if acts of terror are directly or indirectly connected to the crave political changes. This debate field consists of proposal such as a difference between two different arguments and there is the plan of a direct connection between the use of political change and terror. In the Pape seminal work, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is discussed (2005), and terrorism strategies are discussed in Kydd and Walter (2006) work (Aureo de Toledo Gomes, n.d.). In 2005 Pape states that the terrorism is identified as the employ of violence by a non-state organization to scare a certain audience. And also Pape accent that, in common words, the terrorism purposes are enrolling more supporters and implementing their opponents under threats. Through this, the purpose of terrorism campaigns is ready to achieve these objectives, and want to balance them and arrange certain objectives according to specific crisis. So this requirement to arrange culminates in different forms of terrorism.

The 'demonstrative terrorism' is nothing but publicity seeker for a specific cause. The 'destructive terrorism' means to insists pressure on opponents by the tool of death threat and to summon support for its need. In 2005, Pape insist that terrorists want to impose damage on target-audience members, executing the risk of dropping others' condolence, which is not important the case with demonstrative terrorism. According to the 'Suicide terrorism', it's

seems to pressurize the target-audience without counting, if it will create aggression, not only in connection to the act, but also counterpart other observers. A typical quality of this terrorism is that the terrorist not look forward to get through the mission (Anon., n.d.). And also Pape debates that the large portion of attacks by terrorist are not secluded acts engaged by militant individuals, but quite sectors of larger campaigns organized by groups which have a goal of attaining a specific political goal. Therefore to grasp the crux of terrorism the two dominant theories of terrorism as discussed subsequently in this paper.

INSTRUMENTAL / STRATEGIC APPROACH

Instrumental Approach says that “terrorism is a means to political end” (Crenshaw, n.d.) which implies that terrorism is an intentional act used as a strategic tool by the terrorist organisations to achieve their political objective. By carrying out a terror deed they transmit their aim and purpose to the existing system of governments and institutions. So, by this approach we could say that terrorism is a calculated course of action, a conscious and deliberate choice designed to achieve a defined objective” (McCormick, n.d.). But the defined objective could be for a brief period or long period of time which can be accomplished either explicitly or implicitly. So, it could be said that terrorism is a coercive method of bargaining process which had its base on the power to hurt to threaten the opponent (Schelling, n.d.) The power to hurt is used by the terrorist organisation as an instrument to gain attention and also to limelight the numerous forms of suppression perpetuated by the established legitimate state institutions like separatist politics mass polarisation leading to deprivation of minorities and discriminatory treatment of refugees resulting in violent atrocities against them. These components are used by the terror organisations as a justification to propel the power to hurt as a payback retaliation measure on the established society. This feature of power to hurt gets escalated when targets are of symbolic importance and when they are attacked by terrorist organisation it helps them to attain media reach and serves the purpose of conveying the underlying objective to their rival. In addition to that these type of attacks also gains historical significance among the members of terrorist organization as they considered it as a landmark victory for the particular terrorist organization and gives a feeling of successfully striving towards their objective. For example the 9/11 attack is considered as a landmark victory among the members of Alquaeda against US and after that the status of that terror organisation had gone global.

The principal component strategic approach suggests that there is a constant search for continuous innovation to maintain an element of surprise in carrying out terror offences against the opponent. It is celebrated as a par excellence strategy as the defenders would be clueless to counter due to their lack of preparation. As Crenshaw points out, terrorism is a “new mode of warfare” and the act of carrying out a terror attack is itself an innovation (Crenshaw, n.d.). But with increasing intelligence agencies and counter policy measures that emanates from the understanding of terror organisation tactics the terror attack plans based on previous tactics are more probably to be thwarted by the government. Crenshaw (1987) points out the previous methods of terror organizations like hijacking aircraft, taking hostages, capturing consulates and embassies , abducting diplomats became familiar with intelligence agencies results in devising efficient counter policies with strengthening of vigilance authorities (Crenshaw, n.d.). As it is critical for the terrorist organization to sustain the component of surprise attacks they started shifting to suicide bombings.

The instrumental approach illustrates that aside from surprise attack terror plots it is essential for the terrorist organization to implant the powerful ideological belief that guides and binds the activities of organisation and its members with reason and purpose. Like revising the terror tactics constantly the ideological basis must also be altered to suit its objective and relevance. As Crenshaw (1987) mentions – “terrorist ideology, no matter how unrealistic, must be taken seriously as a guide to intentions” (Crenshaw, n.d.). Hence the terror strikes reflect the ideological convictions that are rooted in the terror organization. Therefore the focus of the strike, the casualties and the timing are implicit factors that eventually contribute to portray the ideological convictions of the terrorist organizations.

Another distinct characteristic put forth by the strategic approach is the coexistence of reciprocal operational relationship among various players propounded by Schelling (1980) and further quoted by McCormick (2003). Therefore this presumption suggests that the terrorist organization’s decision to act – the choice of targets, tactics and timing – is influenced by the decision of its opponents (Anon., n.d.) or any other actor that influence its strategic environment”) (McCormick, n.d.). Anyway the presumption of reciprocal operational relationship between two actors coexisting in a game of chance and game of strategy can also be applied in the reverse manner as a measure of retaliation (Schelling, n.d.). For instance, the declaration of War on Iraq by US with false depiction of Iraq possessing Weapons of mass destruction can be seen as a reciprocal act of resistance cloaked

as the legitimate retaliatory response to the 9/11 terror attack of Alquaeda. Therefore this continuous loop of action and reaction between two parties contributes to the game of terrorism and when the loop escalates the ideological doctrine of terror organizations is inducted in par with the objectives.

Then the strategic approach also tend to explain that one of the prominent feature possessed by the terrorist organisation is that act with collective rationality (Waterman, n.d.). McCormick (2003) express that the terrorist organisation in this perspective is not viewed to be a group of possible contradictory views of the world affairs or diverging stance about means and ends rather it is considered to be a unitary actor, defined by certain characteristic features with a single, stable, and ordered set of preferences, that is able to identify, evaluate and decide among competing options with a single mind” (McCormick, n.d.). So it implies that terrorism cannot be considered as an isolated attack rather it is used as a strategic instrument that encompasses a list of factors designed to achieve the comprehensive organizational objectives.

Subequently the procedural approach of instrumental theory asserts that terrorist organization might act rationally in response to their beliefs about the world system around them but these beliefs are insufficient reflections of reality (McCormick, n.d.). The procedural instrumental approach application is evident in the dubious theological and fictious narratives crafted by various terrorist organisations to motivate the members in their effort to accomplish the utopian goals putforth by fallacious propaganda. As the withering of ideals might result in breakdown of members will to fight which may end in the collapse of the terror organistaions , they tend to focus with great attention to sustain a vigorous ideological narrative which pushes the organization ahead.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS THEORY

Differing from the instrumental approach the organizational process theory states that the activities of a terrorist organizations reflect the inner dynamics of the organisation itself instead of strategic action as putforth by instrumental approach (Crenshaw, n.d.). “A terrorist organization is not a black box, but a living system subjected to a range of influences that may be tangentially related to its strategic objectives” (McCormick, n.d.). Organizational theory argues that like any other organization the foremost goal of the terrorist organisation is

to survive. So it implies that though the terror attacks carried out largely reflect the goals and purpose of the organization it mainly reflects one of its prominent goals the survival need. Crenshaw (1987) mentions that inspite of any organization being self-reliant, the survival condition is of great importance for the organization (Crenshaw, n.d.). Thus, terror acts are used as a means to represent the survival need of the organization but anyway survival in some cases may have switched from executing terror attacks to exhibiting the presence of terror organization through disseminated networks or capturing territory.

The survival ability of the organization is demonstrated in various ways from individual/group terror attacks to acquiring territory and further the survival of the terror organization depends on the circumstantial variation dependent on the activities of the organization. Crenshaw (1987) states that the dynamics of the organization have switched by examining the features with which the terror organisations has attached itself (Crenshaw, n.d.). Moreover Crenshaw(1987) asserts that the leaders and other prominent members of the terror organization have transcended the goal of survival by linking their personal ambitions with organizational viability and tends to foster measures that would help them to acquire a considerable political position (Crenshaw, n.d.). So, in order to increase organization political potential and sustainability the leader tends to carry out any measure without taking it towards the complete collapse or destruction. Hence the leaders must build an undisputed charismatic image in order to exercise this kind of absolute authority and power. Therefore to sustain the leadership , “leaders in the terror organisations give some tangible and intangible incentives that increases the strive to accomplish the obectives of organization ” (Crenshaw, n.d.). These incentives vary from ideological incentives to the personal incentives that are redemptive in nature. The reward includes recognition and publicity with monetary gain for the members in the terror organization whey they declare their allegiance to the particular terror organization after carrying out a terror attack.

For the organization to survive it is imperative for it to have an ideological incentive that stems from the strong ideological framewok. Without it the organization will find itself in a very difficult situation to both retain their members and also to recruit new members which may even result to the hinderance of the normal functioning of the terror organization. So the terror organization provide strong ideological incentives for allegiance and identity as it helps it to strengthen the goals of organization by weakening political reason. The ideological

incentives are mostly based on the narrative that constitutes a methodical complete elimination of established political set-up and replacing it with a new system.

Another prominent incentive the terror organizations provides is that the personal incentive which are mostly redemptive in nature. It means that the act of violence committed by the members of the organization has personal meaning to them as they gain recognition on behalf of the organization (Crenshaw, n.d.). The organizational approach emphasize that the incentive for the members of the terror organization particularly among the foreign fighters to carry out a violent attack is more ideological and redemptive in the sense to fulfill their personal agony through retaliation rather than to simply accomplish the organizational goals.

Crenshaw(1987) mentions that besides giving incentives and rewards the leaders of the terrorist organization should possess strong entrepreneurship skills to build and sustain the organization with the ability to create and manipulate those incentives and rewards to attract the existing and new members. To do that the foundational leader and other surviving leaders in current phase should have an “an exceptional commitment to the group’s purposes and an exaggerated sense of the group’s likely efficacy” (Crenshaw, n.d.). Therefore the leaders show a tendency to wage a “fantasy war” (Ferracuti, n.d.)- based on theological and mythical beliefs in the minds of the members, giving an impression of acting as soldiers (McCormick, n.d.). This belief system provides a false sense of self-righteousness, triggering what has been termed by (Cordes, n.d.)as auto-propaganda among members. Another fallacious narrative propounded to the members of terror organization is that their activities are defensive in nature. (Rapoport, n.d.). So the terrorist organizations “claim to act in defence of a large community whose integrity and well-being are at risk” (Gurr, n.d.). Terrorist organizations more or less don’t take responsibility for their own actions as initiator rather always try to give a portrayal of carrying out the attack as a retaliation to some kind (McCormick, n.d.).

The structure approach also site out that terrorist organizations are Clandestine, “violent ‘underground’ organizations, that possess sure structural characteristics that create the structure line of research particularly productive” (McCormick, n.d.). There's a progressive isolation associated with alienation from established society as terrorist organizations go deeper underground; cluster decision-making process becomes more closed, rigid and

inward-looking method (McCormick, n.d.). Because the organization distances itself from society, the cohesiveness and commonality among the terror organization grows stronger. So the members who are not in line with the goals of terror organization has now only left with 2 options either to exit or to express their dissent(Hirschman, n.d.). The initial option to exit ends up in a organizational member joining the rival organization which shelters the member's defiance. If the dissent member didn't find a place with the other rival terror organization then the member might to establish a new terrorist camp provided if the member has enough influence to pull out the other members from previous organization to the new one. So, Exit option is preferred only after a failed effort to voice a dissent which can accelerate the decline of the organization but expressing a dissent in itself can be equivalently destructive to the terror organization (Crenshaw, n.d.). Thus to protect the continuity and unity inside the organization the leaders powerfully discourage any sort of dissent.

In a terror organization that is dedicated to violence the incentive is placed on cohesion and harmony therefore the structure of the organization is highly hierarchical with authoritarian attitude (Crenshaw, n.d.). To prevent exit and dissent, the leaders seek the members loyal allegiance to the organization insisting unity and obligation to the goals of the organization which they build it through robust ideological framework. So if the dissent is crushed inside the terror organization it is perceived as strengthening the loyalty towards the organization which helps the leaders decisions to be homogenized in character so that the member would not raise their query over the collective decision regarding management, guidance and control of the terror organization.

As expressing dissent against the collective is considered as an disloyal act and an indirect threat to the existence of the organization itself the leaders place a strict counter incentive measures to curb dissent and exit from the organization. First the leaders put in place the severe initiation cost (Hirschman, n.d.)meaning that the prerequisite conditioning to join the terror organization will be severe so the members will be hesitant to exit the organization as they had put in lot of effort and undergone rigorous training to join the organization. Next the leaders will put up a strong ideological doctrine that bound the members as a group together so even the entire organization failed to accomplish its objectives the members of the organization continue to fight firmly to manifest that their ideological doctrine is right and to prove themselves that the decision to join the particular terror organization is right rather than accepting it as an error (Hirschman, n.d.). The demise of an organization with an implant ideology might lead to a psychological switch from smugness to distraught fanaticism in a

organization without leadership. Therefore the contemporary terrorist organization invest largely in the ideological propaganda thereby promoting their ideas through various tools as a brand in order to implant the ideological conviction among the members of the organization. Finally the leaders place harsh penalties like death to strike fear among other members showing that there is a heavy cost involved if they decide to leave the organization. With such severe counter measures, members of the terror organization likely to have a tendency to go along to get along which minimizes the ability of organizational members to function in the leader's absence or in organizational vacuum for a particular event.

The organizational approach further exhibits that the terrorist organizations are influenced by competition among other rival terror organizations. Like rival political parties or groups the terrorist organizations also contest against each other to gain attention among their sympathizers and to elevate their stature among other terror organization. For this purpose the terror organizations use violence and terror attacks as currency as the rival organizations compete for media attention almost like established foundation of political constituents (McCormick, n.d.). Thus the competition among terror organization results in escalation of violence as they try to surpass one another not only to keep their existing organizational members but also to allure, appeal and employ new recruits.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The combination of two major approaches of terrorism namely the strategic approach and organizational process theory has been used as a theoretical framework for the entire study to be conducted about one of the prominent terror organization Al-Qaeda in this paper. The two theories has been reconciled in a such a way that the organization process theory is used as a way to complete the strategic theory to know how the certain organizational features contribute to the effective and efficient functioning of Al-Qaeda to achieve its objectives.

To analyse the modus operandi of Al-Qaeda it is necessary to understand the basic distinction between organization and group. The group defines the gathering of non-state actors collectively to carry out a terror act to accomplish its minimum political objectives whereas the organization is defined by skillfully structured establishment with systematic administrative operations to carefully calibrate plan, control, coordinate and execute the objectives of organization. In this distinction the name Al-Qaeda-The "Base" refers to its

extensive spread of networks with its distinct affiliates which notify that it exhibits the characteristics that are different from IRA and Hamas- the terror organizations of 20th century. Therefore Al-Qaeda serves as a blueprint for the terror organizations of 21st century that points out an elaborate widespread international network with a strong media base for propagation and a devolved structure in form of affiliates. Thus Al-Qaeda is addressed as a terror organization throughout the paper and its distinct features are discussed using organizational theory.

This paper considers that terror organizations use terrorism as a strategic weapon to achieve their political objective thereby guaranteeing its survival existence. But here it is important to understand that the link between terror acts and political change or changing the status quo is indirect as exhibited by Diniz (2004) and Mendes (2014) (Aureo de Toledo Gomes, n.d.). They argue that understanding terrorism as a use or threat of using force is incomplete as they are different from use of force in war because destruction caused by terrorism has little weight in relation to the numerical or material balance of forces in play. Therefore the primary means of terrorism is to induce a psychological fear in the population. Considering terrorism as a means to achieve an organization's final political objective of altering the status quo it is important to understand the difference between non-terrorist use of force and terrorist use of force and their link between altering the status quo. The primary difference between them lies in the connection between the terror act and their intended political objective as the non-terrorist use of force has direct influence on the target behaviour like during WWII, the strategic bombardment of Japan which made explicit use of terror. While the terrorist use of force has an indirect impact on the target behaviour to achieve its long term political objective. Though it does not have the capacity to alter the status quo immediately the use of terror tries to alter the correlation in the favour of the terror organization by raising awareness for its cause or denouncing the abuses perpetrated by its opponent. By understanding this difference it helps us to differentiate between terrorist actors by the use of terror. Furthermore, it does not exclude 'a priori' a certain grouping from being understood as a state actor.

In addition to inducing psychological fear among the population terrorism also tends to make governments and individuals to respond in a way that a terror organization wants so that they can use it to their advantage. Kydd and Walter (2006) argues that the terror organizations are too weak to impose their will on people through direct force so they would always try to persuade people indirectly by altering their perception using the ability to impose high costs

and showing a high level of commitment towards their objective and cause. Dwelled upon this argument Kydd and Walter (2006) has laid out 5 strategic logics for terrorism(KYDD, n.d.). First the terror organization uses the attrition strategy where they seek to convince the adversary that they are powerful enough to inflict high costs if the opponent continue to pusue a specific policy(KYDD, n.d.). Then comes the strategy of intimidation where they attempt to persuade the population that they have the potential to punish the disobedience and the government didn't have the ability to stop them so that it is better for the people to behave in the way as terror organization desires(KYDD, n.d.). Next, the provocation strategy where they induce the opponent to counter to terrorism with unconsidered violence by which they try to persuade and radicalize the sympathizers in population to join particular terror organization thereby increasing the organizational strength through new recruits(KYDD, n.d.). Then the strategy of spoiler attacks is used by the terror organization when a peace deal is to be reached particularly without considering them in a negotiation process where they seek to insist both the population and opponent that the moderates working for the cause similar to that of particular terror organizations and supports them are fragile and they are not trustworthy to deserve the support thereby sabotaging the effort to reach a peace agreement(KYDD, n.d.). Finally, the terror organization uses the outbidding strategy in which they uses violence in the form of terror attacks as a prominent tool to convince the audience that they possess greater determination to fight for the cause than other rival organizations and therefore they must be entitled to larger support from the public(KYDD, n.d.). Out of these 5 strategies except using terrorism as a strategy of outbidding all other 4 strategies are fit to the operation of Al-Qaeda which had been dealt in detail in this paper. Furthermore, the strategic framework laid out aspect of surprise element in terrorist attacks is used to analyze how terror organizations are in a constant process to innovate to keep the element of surprise in their attacks as it provides them advantage over the opponent. Then the organizational process theory is used in this paper to analyse the features of leadership skills, organizational structure, the incentives provided, the decentralization process to strengthen the operational capability of the organization.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this research paper, a qualatitative case study research method is used to gain a deeper insights and better understanding about the modus operandi of a terror organization. With a theoretical framework that combines prominent features from both strategic approach and

organizational process theory , a case study has been constructed about one of the prominent terror organizations Al-Qaeda dwell in detail about why these terror organization uses the terror acts, what are the strategies involved in it and how the certain features contributed to its organizational efficiency and the existence. The data used in the study are mostly secondary data which are derived from the sources like official websites, journals, books, reports, articles, documentaries, interviews.

The case study is constructed in such a way that it first describes the historical background specifically about the context of origin of the terror organization and the objectives that they aim to accomplish. Then the case study further continues to analyse the modus operandi of the terror organization in which their terror attacks are analysed through 4 out of 5 strategic logics of terrorism laid out by Kydd and Walter (2006), and also about the various tools they innovate and use it to maintain an element of surprise in carrying out the terror acts. Then as a part of mode of operation analysis the case study continues to analyse the leadership skills, the placement of ideological incentives, personal incentives, the organizational structure, the source of revenue and its logistics supply that makes it one of the successful terror organization which continues to possess a threat to international peace and security. Then the case study concludes by illustrating what are the present conditions of Al-Qaeda and how they strategically re-orient themselves to play a longer game in the conflict prone regions of the world.

CASE STUDY - AL-QAEDA

BACKGROUND HISTORY AND ITS EVOLUTION :

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan cannot be detached from the Establishment and formation of Al-Qaeda. Daoud Khan ended the monarchy in Afghanistan, then proclaiming it as a republic he administered Afghanistan through the period of 1973-1978. Though Daoud Khan initially had support from communists he began to shift towards right in 1977. With the deep recession that was plaguing the country they were looking for an external source of revenue without sorting the help from Soviet thereby aiming to reduce its dependence on Soviet. As a result, encouraged by US Afghan government had opened the talks with Iran which fetched Kabul US \$ 2 billion for a period of 10 years (EWANS, n.d.). This aggravated the enmity to Daoud Khan which united the various sections of Communist Party against him.

When Daoud Khan finally tries to eliminate all communists from the army the prominent institution that is responsible for controlling the country, the Soviet in fear of discarded from the politics of Afghanistan set out for the removal of Daud Khan by unifying the communists. Thus the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was established in 1978 after the assassination of Daoud Khan and his whole family. Though influenced by the Soviet model the new Afghan government carried out reforms to modernize the country, the new laws regarding marriage and Agriculture had created backlashes among the population which was further intensified by brutally suppressing the opposition demonstration and dissatisfaction over the issues(COLL, n.d.).

Around the same time of turbulence in Afghanistan in 1979 the world has witnessed other important political events that has great impact on international politics. The Iran revolution of 1979 had overthrown the Shah Reza who was an ally to the west camp and replaced with Islamic Republic based on Shiite Theocracy. In the same year around the month of November the group that opposes Al Saud Monarchy tries to seize the Great Mosque of Mecca which scratch the first large resistance against the government of Saudi from its inception. In the limelight of this political events there was a fear that Afghanistan may also move towards the Iranian solution to resort its issues so anticipating the internal collapse of Communist government in Afghanistan, on 24 December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded the Afghanistan (SAIKAL, n.d.). This provided the impetus for the formation of Al-Qaeda claiming resistance against the occupation of foreign power in Afghan soil. Though there were geopolitical interests of countries like US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are involved in eroding the existence of Soviet Union in the region the narrative of Communist state capturing a Muslim country provided catalyst for the formation of resistance to protect Islam(COLL, n.d.). As a consequence, in 1988 Bin laden, Al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam established Al-Qaeda in Peshawar during the course of their private meeting. Al-Qaeda which initially established to channel funds and fighters to the resistance of Afghanistan against USSR has started to escort the Muslim struggles around the world after the withdrawal of USSR including revolts against the rule that was considered apostates(BYMAN, n.d.). Bin laden went to Saudi Arabia after Soviet collapse in Afghanistan where he found US troops Stationed since the invasion of Iraq in 1990 which he considered undesirable and disgraceful because of the Foreign troops presence in Muslim lands that are sacred and holy. This led to his hostility towards Saud regime in addition to the elevation of his already existed clearly expressed adversary against US. This made Bin laden to work with groups that are rivals to monarchy

of Al Saud which ended in bin laden becoming a Persona non grata with exiling to Sudan (1991 -1992) the only viable option left for him(COLL, n.d.).

After moving to Sudan bin laden found the necessary conditions to build his organization by reaching an agreement with the government of Sudan. In one way, bin laden spent his personal fortunes to the build the infrastructure projects in Sudan in return the government of Sudan provided him with space for training camps and other essential conditions to carry out their operation(MIGAUX, n.d.). This honeymoon period between them did not last for long time as the activities of bin laden started grabbing attention from the monarchies of Persian Gulf it increased middle east pressure on Sudan government to expel bin laden. In 1996, when the international sanctions were imposed on Sudan it has no other choice rather than to urge bin laden and his organization to exit the country.

Next Al-Qaeda entered in to Afghanistan during the dominating rule of Taliban in the entire region where according to stern and Bergen Al-Qaeda submitted itself as subordinate at least officially to Taliban through an accepted allegiance and obligation between Mullah Omar, leader of Taliban at that time and Osama bin laden, Leader of Al-Qaeda(STERN, n.d.). This leads to the opening of Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan by Taliban at the beginning of 1997. It was estimated that the volunteers at the range of 10,000 to 20,000 were trained in combat and terror acts after gained access to those areas. But these favor was not free of cost where Al-Qaeda in return to fill the Taliban's coffers each year with US \$20- \$30 million from their annual budgets prior to 9/11 attack.(Anon., (2004),)

After the twin tower attack by Al-Qaeda there was huge pressure on the Taliban to hand over bin laden to which they refused eventually resulted in US retaliation of launching Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 on 7th October. Taliban collapsed after one month of rigorous fighting they fell on November 13, 2001 but none of their main leaders including Bin laden were not caught. It is approximated that Al-Qaeda lost almost 80% of their members and training camps(BYMAN, n.d.). Though Al-Qaeda has been severely damaged it continues to play an important role in subsequent terror attacks specifically in 2002 Tunisia synagogue attacks and Bali nightclub explosions, 2004 Madrid train station explosions and 2005 London metro station explosions. At last, US Navy seal assassinated Bin laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011 which paved the way for Al-Zawahiri to ascend to the leader of Al-Qaeda. Though Al-Qaeda had faced severe blow with the death of Bin laden it continues to

be a major threat by reinventing and regrouping itself as a decentralised network with many franchises and affiliates that endorses to the ideology of organization laid out by its founding father bin laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

OBJECTIVES OF AL-QAEDA

The Ascendance of Al-Qaeda suggests that it emanates from a contentious tumultuous relationship between the Islam world and the west. Particularly the militant groups continue to propagate the perspective that US and its allies from west and middle-east continues to attack Islam constantly so they seek to alter the status quo that is against Islam which is asymmetrical in power context. In this context Al-Qaeda propounded three primary objectives of their organization. First, the organization tends to function as a terror organization in and of itself. Then they tend to organize, recruit and provide logistics for other Muslim militant outfits therefore giving them incentives to carry out the fight surpassing Afghanistan. Finally, Al-Qaeda tend to act as a spearhead of the resistance therefore integrating and guiding the jihadist movement by giving them reason, motive and direction(BYMAN, n.d.).

Esposito suggests that the movements and organization like Al-Qaeda are the demonstrations of disagreement of modernity itself in which Europe as a forerunner and displayed to the world not only through the dominance of science, military and economy but also by colonization(ESPOSITO, n.d.). Therefore, one can argue that at least from 18th century there was a decline in Muslim world particularly in comparison with European countries. With this picture several thinkers had made connections in a way that the decline of the Muslim world is due to deviations from teachings of Muhammad by Muslim governments. One of the prominent movement that stems from this amalgamation was Wahhabism proposed by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab between 1703-1792. Fundamentally it proclaims that going back and restore to the teachings in Quran and Sunnah the everlasting and flawless sources of Islam are the only solution to escape from the political and social problems of that time. After that during 1950s and 1960s we saw the emergence of Sayyid Qutb which became the primary ideological proponent of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It articulates a perspective that Muslim Society is split between two different and incompatible sections - the believers and non-believers. It also considers the indispensable assertion of an Islamic state as it would be the realization of God's design on the Earth.

It could be seen that the political orientation of the Al-Qaeda reflects at least to some extent to the political and ideological orientation emanating from the complicated context of Wahhabism and ideas of Qutb. They are definitely inspired by Qutb who contemplated the West to be a historical adversary of Islam and the Jihad (understood as an armed struggle by him) was the only path out of that scenario. Further Inspired from Wahhabism Bin Laden considers the governments tend to deviate from the teachings of Muslim and interference of foreign actors are the sources of decline in Muslim world. So it now makes sense that why US was always at the top in the public proclamations of Al-Qaeda(ESPOSITO, n.d.).

Al-Qaeda issued “Fatwa” in 1992 (hailing for Jihad to fight the US troops presence in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim lands) and also in 1996 severely condemning Saudi Arabia for the existence of US troops in Arabian Peninsula thereby elevating the regional issues to the international struggle against US. In that Fatwa issued by Al-Qaeda in 1996 there were numerous allegations against Saudi regime particularly it criticizes that Saudi Arabia has permitted the infidels to set foot into Holy Land referring to Saudi Arabia as it has Mecca and Medina which are considered as Muslim’s most sacred places(BYMAN, n.d.). Further it also condemns Saudi Arabia for suspending the Islamic Law, squandering the oil wealth and disregarding the Palestinian issue and in addition to that it also announces its support for the Palestinian, Bosnian and Chechen conflicts. But above all Bin Laden’s initial step was to beat US as he believed only by that success can be accomplished in other regional local conflicts.

On the whole it could be said that the political goals of Al-Qaeda reflect the Muslim Fundamentalist perception of reversing the status quo what they contemplate as factors and scenarios that leads to submission of Muslim world to the west. Therefore, their beginning goal would be to focus on efforts to combat against US as they consider it as the primary reason for the mishaps of various regions. Then the following move would be to subvert the established apostate governments thereby creating essential condition for the emergence and establishment of authentic Muslim governments worldwide.

STRATEGIES IN TERROR TACTICS OF AL-QAEDA

Al-Qaeda as a formal terror organization established by Osama bin Laden with its base from Afghanistan and Pakistan has the political objectives of establishing a Muslim world based on strict Sunni explanation of Shariah law which free them from western influence thereby aiming to create a global caliphate that extends from Indonesia to Spain(Anon., n.d.). It tends

to function as a web of Islamic extremists and Salafi jihadists that recruited the members widely from North Africa, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though Al-Qaeda as a terror organization in 2001 was a home to 70,000 members spread across the world in at least 60 countries it has no chance in going against its primary opponent US in a direct confrontation considering it to be a world's major military power. This asymmetrical power relation between them induces the organization to adopt terror tactics as Diniz suggests terrorism is intrinsically, and not just empirically, a stratagem of the weak(Anon., n.d.). So, Al-Qaeda began to nurture and spread out sleeper cells to various countries and also began to plot major terror attacks with US as their primary target. From its inception Al-Qaeda has progressed remarkably and successfully carried out the major terror attacks that includes Kenya and Tanzania US embassies bombings in 1998, USS Cole bombing in 2000, 9/11 attack on WTC (World Trade Centre) and Pentagon in 2001(Anon., n.d.). Therefore, it could be seen that Al-Qaeda uses these terror attacks as a strategic action to achieve its political objectives though it does not immediately alter the status quo it has an indirect impact on the opponent as it was intended to be. For example, it is calculated approximately that the 9/11 terror attack has induced a heavy cost on US of US \$500,000 and resulted in the massive death of nearly 3000 people in addition to the extra cost of US\$ 40 billion with respect to the Twin towers insurance and other nearby adjacent buildings(Anon., n.d.). It was considered as a huge blow to US and Al-Qaeda gained popularity by making it as a historical significant event of humiliating US among its organizational members thereby elevating their organizational status to global level to achieve their major political objective.

In 2005, Al-Quds-Al-Arabi published the excerpts of Strategy of Al-Qaeda to the year 2020 from the document written by Saifal-Adel. Abdel Bari Atwan encapsulated this strategy to 5 major phases that eventually release the umma from all sort of oppression.

- By carrying out a series of attacks in west and US that ends in huge casualties provoke them to invade an Islamic country
- Instigate the resistance at the local level to the occupation of foreign troops.
- Enlarge the dispute to adjacent countries and interlock the US and its western allies in an extended attrition war
- Transform Al-Qaeda into an ideology with a group of functional principles which can be chartered to other regions as networks of loosely spread affiliates that does not need a centralized command and control. Through these networks instigate terror attacks on US and its allies until they retreat from the dispute like in the case of train

bombings of Madrid in 2004 but that didn't have the similar impact with bombings of London in 2005.

- Finally, the economy of US will collapse by 2020 due to the pressure of multiple encounters in various regions. Thus it eventually leads to a breakdown of global economic system which ultimately results in international political instability. This moment will pave the way for the Al-Qaeda to lead a jihad globally to install a Wahhabi caliphate throughout the world (Atwan, n.d.)

With this scenario, by applying the strategic logics of terrorism laid out by Kydd and Walter (2006), the terror tactics of Al-Qaeda can be analyzed in a detailed manner to understand their rationale behind these acts and what they intended to achieve it with these strategic actions.

First, Al-Qaeda uses the strategy of attrition in which they seek to convince the US their primary opponent that they are powerful organization to inflict high costs if US continue to occupy Saudi Arabia and pursue anti-muslim policies like supporting Israel in conflict between Palestinian and Israel. In a broadcast on November 2004 bin Laden bragged that “ We had gained enough experience in guerilla warfare in our fight against the prominent suppressive super power Russia in which mujahidin and we as a team fought it for ten years and crushed it down until they reach bankruptcy and decided to evacuate their troops in defeat. We continue to do the same with US making them bleed with multiple cuts to the point till they became bankrupt”(KYDD, n.d.)

This strategy of attrition is well suited for the Al-Qaeda's specific goals of accomplishing a policy change. Bin Laden often argued that US lacks the determination to combat a long term attritional war in his Jihad declaration that came out in February 1996. In this Bin Laden continues to boast against US that “ Where was the deceptive bravery of US when there was Beirut explosions in 1983. You were dissipated into bits and pieces; totally 241 soldiers were killed in which most of them were marines. And where was this deceptive courage of yours when two explosions made you to quit Aden within 24 hours. But your most shameful scenario is in Somalia where after your rigorous propaganda about the US strength and creating a new post coldwar world order with your leadership you moved the international forces including 20,000 US soldiers entered into Somalia. But when you faced minor setbacks of your tens of soldiers getting killed in small battles and 1 US pilot was hauled in

Mogadishu streets you quit the area with dismay, embarrassment and failure carrying your dead with you. Clinton threatened and promised revenge in front of the world but these were just a preparation for your withdrawal from there. You had been dismayed by Allah and you withdrew which shows clearly the extent of your impotence and weakness.(KYDD, n.d.)

This statements shows that for the bin laden the strategy of attrition is more appealing as he firmly believed that Al-Qaeda and himself would be difficult to target with counter attacks. With Taliban on the verge of completely destroying the northern alliance in Afghanistan Al-Qaeda beleived that Afghanistan as a landlocked country would seem to be invincible to Invasion of US which made them to target the finacial heart of US there by trying to increase the costs for their policy to station US troops in Saudi Arabia.

Next the use of Intimidation strategy by Al-Qaeda to attain a wider social control over the people. This would be used when the opponent specifically the governments has continuously disagreed to pursue a policy that terror organizations demand and where the attempts to change it appears pointless. In this scenario, the terror organization would turn to intimidation strategy to foist their favored policy directly on the people, attaining assent through selective violence and the warning of future retribution. Al-Qaeda uses intimidation actions that varies from individual assassinations of powerful peope to the bombings of major buildings. This can be best explained by the series of car bombings including the jordanian embassy bombings in Baghdad and imam ali mosque bombings of 2003 carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq which was led by Zarqawi. This was targeted against the police recruits and the powerful leaders of the opponent like Al-hakim the leader of the supreme council for Islamic revolution in Iraq who was killed in imam ali mosque bombings of 2003. By this the Al-Qaeda in Iraq aims to gain a wider control over the iraq people to suppor their cause of taking down iraq government and American soldiers forcing them to withdraw as Zarqawi has pledged an all out war on Shitte, Iraq government and US soldiers(KYDD, n.d.).

Then the Strategy of Provocation by which Al-Qaeda tends to induce the opponent to counter them with unconsidered violence by which they try to persuade and radicalize the segments in population to support them. Al-Qaeda by carrying out the terror attack of 9/11 they aim to target the US recognition of important economic and military power and provoke them to respond in a way of violent military response thereby accomplishing the Al-Qaeda's greater goal of radicalizing the Muslim population of the world. When the George W. Bush pursued

the foreign policy that emphasized the hard power thereby encouraging the use of extreme military measures Bin laden in 2004 November video tape boasted that Al-Qaeda found it is very easy for us to provoke this US administration. The strategy of provocation used by Al-Qaeda seems to be working as Pew Survey conducted in 2004 found that Global trust of US had declined remarkably in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of 2003. Likewise in a report released by International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2004 it is found that the Iraq invasion of US has boosted the Al-Qaeda's recruitment that increases their organizational strength and their efforts of raising funds for their cause. As in the words of Shibley Telhami, "What we're seeing now is a disturbing sympathy with al-Qaeda coupled with resentment toward the United States. Like Bin Laden said in the video tape of 2004 as the Bush Administration was very keen to overthrow Saddam Hussein an impulse that existed even before 9/11 attacks has contributed to the significant growth of Al-Qaeda worldwide (KYDD, n.d.). This was because the lack of intelligence on Al-Qaeda at that point of time has not made possible to carry out the selected counterattack on targets that are responsible for the attack either explicitly or implicitly. This unleashed the huge violence on Iraq population which resulted in large victimization of masses ultimately capitalized by Al-Qaeda for its immense growth. This provocation strategy by Al-Qaeda is not limited to US government or other Western governments which are allies of US but also implies to its population that adversely affects the Muslims in these western societies. It is evident that after 9/11 the attacks against Muslims and the overall opinion against immigrants are all time high in US. Frequent terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda has further contributed to the Islamophobia in US and across other western countries specifically in U.K. In 2006 Sheridan conducted a study in UK which shows that there is a increase of 83% in discerned indirect discrimination and 76 % rise in direct discrimination against Muslims among the collected samples of British Muslims. Further studies about July 7 London bombings in which the surveys among public also shows that living as Muslim is considered to be a powerful indicator of considerable stress in a society. This clearly illustrates that provocation strategy used by Al-Qaeda increases the hostility against the Muslims living in western societies that had contributed to increased animosity and segregation between the Muslims and Non-Muslims. This led to the scenario like Louis and Taylor explained in 2002 that after 9/11 the innocent Muslims who were not terrorists became victims of the anti-Muslim attacks which led the moderates in Muslims to the perspective that Al-Qaeda might be right in their view of US and its Western allies comprises to be an unappeasable adversaries of Islam. Moreover the continuous violent reactionary justified by hardline politicians and academics of west in citing to the perspective

prescribed in the Clash of Civilizations has only contributed to the justification of the attacks by Al-Qaeda in a retrospect manner which led to the potential option of new recruits which was not available before. So, the successful interaction between Al-Qaeda's propoganda of Islam being consistently threatened by west and the extreme violent retaliatory reponses by both government and society in west has fetched Al-qaeda a worldwide support making the strategy of provocation central to its modus operandi(KYDD, n.d.).

Then the use of terror attacks as spoiler acts that are aimed to subvert the peace which seems to nurture between moderates of terror organizations and the opponent generally the government of specific country. This strategy make use of the existing mistrust between the parties involved in the peace negotiation process. Through their terror attacks the terror organization enlarges the existing mistrust thereby producing discrepancies in the peace process which may ultimately led to the failure as the parties involved failed to reach an agreement over the issues. In the case of 9/11 attack of Al-Qaeda, though there is no alleged connection of Saudi government as an institution with 9/11 attack as per the 9/11 commission report findings of US, the mention of Saudi Arabia as a major source of funding for Al-qaeda and identifying 15 out of 19 terrorists involved in the attack were citizens of Saudi Arabia has heightened the uncertainty and made the US to question the trustworthiness of Saudi Arabia as an ally. Likewise, Al-Qaeda's series of insurgency attacks on Saudi Arabia in the wake of Iraq invasion by US including the riyadh compound bombings in 2003 with the aim to topple the Saudi Government has shown them that the message of Al-Qaeda resonates widely with Saudi population appealing to their animosity towards US particularly with george bush and Iraq invasion. Though Saudi Arabia has succeeded in supressing Al-Qaeda with their effective counter insurgency measures it has an intense effect on foreign policy of Saudi Arabia as they tends to move away from US and started building relations with other Islamic countries and political groupings. So, it has been evident that 9/11 attacks in 2001 and and series of attacks on Saudi Arabia including the riyadh compound bombings in 2003 by Al-Qaeda has acted as a spoiler strategy which has been drafted to reduce the trust and aggravate the uncertainty between the US and Saudi Arabia thereby seperating them to the advantage of Al-Qaeda in advancing their cause and achieveing its objective particularly in Middle east specifically in Iraq at that time.(KYDD, n.d.)

After 9/11 the governments worldwide had strengthened its counter policy measures through effective intelligence making it difficult for the terror organization like Al-Qaeda to carry out

the large scale attack like 9/11. As Crenshaw points out the previous methods of terror organizations like Al-Qaeda that involves hijacking aircraft, taking hostages, capturing consulates and embassies, abducting diplomats had become outdated with its increasing familiarity with intelligence agencies they started shifting to suicide bombings particularly encouraging lone wolf attacks with effective propaganda through online platforms to sustain the component of surprise in their terror attacks. The Abu Musab al-Suri who was a ex-strategist and jihadist of Al-Qaeda called it as individual terrorism and explained that it gives the youth who don't want to be a part of organizational structure but wish to contribute to the objective of the organization an opportunity to proceed on their beliefs. With the advent of online communication platforms the prospect of Suri's individual terrorism had become widespread as it helps the terror organizations to get greater attention in a quick time period without indulging in massive terror attacks. Burke in the age of selfie jihadism explains that how evolution of media has a profound effect on terrorism as the terrorists in modern era tend to exploit the benefits of online platforms and the technologies that are based on encryption to execute and broadcast terror attacks in live real time. As it is increasingly difficult for the terror organization to accomplish their goals as one single unit particularly when they face a setback through series of blows like in case of Al-Qaeda losing 80% of their base camps and members in a retaliatory measure of the US after 9/11 attack and eventually losing its primary personalities including its leader Bin Laden who was killed in 2011 by US Navy seal operation, the lone wolf attacks helps them to represent its objectives and keep them alive in their fight. As a result Al-Qaeda had strongly advocated ramming vehicles as an efficient and effective terrorism method because the hindrances to carry out these attacks are usually low and it only needs the driving ability to carry out such an attack. Al-Qaeda even published an article in its E-magazine *Inspire* under the title of The ultimate mowing machine in which the author extensively explains about target selection conditions and lay out guidelines to do maximum damage and casualties through appropriate selection of vehicles suitable to the attack.

Though Al-Qaeda seems to be conservative in its use of online technologies when compared to ISIS but that does not mean that it shy away from reaping the benefits of the drastic growth of online communication platforms. As the communication technologies acts as an excellent device to examine the potential profile of the people who could be persuaded and manipulated to join their organization, these different communication platforms available online like Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, Skype and kik helps Al-Qaeda to propagate,

radicalize and recruit new members to the organization. It also helps the organization to engage its followers about the organizational day to day activities and provide a glimpse of jihadi fighter's life projecting it as adventurous and purposeful. Further these online tools are used by Al-Qaeda to constantly remind the objectives of organization to its members and supporters for their continuous commitment in propagation against their primary opponents - the US and its western allies. For instance, in its e-magazine Inspire Al-Qaeda celebrates the US twin tower attacks to evoke the feeling of accomplishing an exceptional deed among the members and supporters of the organization. In that same article the author mention the 9/11 attacks as blessed attacks on the American soil", and "the blessed attack in the heart of the crusader". These type of propaganda helps Al-Qaeda to upheld its historical significance among the members of the organization to give a feeling of successfully striving towards their objective particularly when they are in a weak position trying to rebuild themselves from their collapse. By coupling the Al-Qaeda's organizational bequest with 9/11 attack it also try to counter the competition from ISIS which confronts the supremacy of Al-Qaeda in Jihadism.

ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES

Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization has some prominent organizational features that helps it to survive, sustain and strengthen the organization in moving towards accomplishing its established objectives. First the organization must have an ideological incentive that stems from the strong ideological framewok to hold the organization together and retain its members to carry out even the normal functions and day to day activities of the organization. These ideological incentives are aimed to weaken the political reasoning and are generally based on the narrative that constitutes a methodical complete elimination of established political set-up and replacing it with a new system. In the case of Al-Qaeda deconstructing the hegemony of US along with its allies is considered as its paramount goal which enjoys wider incentive in terms of ideological goal due to its greater global appeal. It further extends to emphasize on striving towards eventual establishment of global Islamic ummah worldwide – a ideological narrative narrative that constitutes a methodical complete elimination of established political set-up (in this case US led International system and western democratic

systems) and replacing it with a new system (Global caliphate- Islamic ummah-authentic Muslim governments based on stringent sunni interpretation of shariah law). Though ideological incentive forms the basic foundation there is another form of incentive which is personal that gives an individual a feeling of redemption to fulfill their personal agony through retaliation rather than to simply accomplish the organizational goals particularly in carrying out suicide bombing attacks and individual terrorism acts such as vehicle ramming. Thus the combination of ideological and redemptive personal incentives drives the members of the Al-Qaeda to carry out terror attacks and other activities on behalf of the organization which in turn guarantee its survival by maintaining its relevance and making its appeal to the audience that they are striving and moving towards the manifested objectives of the organization.

To build and sustain the organization the leaders of the terrorist organization should possess a strong entrepreneurship skill to create and manipulate those incentives and rewards to attract and retain the existing and new members. To do that the leaders should have an “an exceptional commitment to the group’s purposes and an exaggerated sense of the group’s likely efficacy which they show by a tendency to wage a “fantasy war”based on theological and mythical beliefs in the minds of the members, giving an impression of acting as soldiers (Anon., n.d.). In the case of Al-Qaeda it could be seen that both Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri exhibited their leadership skills through their presence in virtual medium to address the followers and members with strong propaganda. With their undisputed charisma and efficient strategy, the leaders of Al-Qaeda always tend to equate and encourage the terror acts by the members and followers of Al-Qaeda to be in line with organizational objectives. For instance, the aspect of inspiring members and equating their terror action as a form of war based on theological and mythical beliefs could be found in Bin Laden’s speeches released in 2001 which mentions that *God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America. May God bless them and allot them a supreme place in heaven, for he is the only one capable and entitled to do so. When those have stood in defense of their weak children, their brothers and sisters in Palestine and other Muslim nations, the whole world went into an uproar, the infidels followed by the hypocrites*(Anon., n.d.).In addition to propagating a fantasy war in the name of god and defending religion, they also try to provide an another fallacious narrative which claims their organization’s activities to be defensive in nature so that rather than being projected as an initiator of attack they always try

to give a portrayal of carrying out the attack as a retaliation to some kind. For example, Bin Laden in his speeches released in 2001 after the 9/11 attack says that

What America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted. Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same for more than 80 years of humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrated. (Anon., n.d.) *A million innocent children are dying at this time as we speak, killed in Iraq without any guilt. We hear no denunciation, we hear no edict from the hereditary rulers. In these days, Israeli tanks rampage across Palestine, in Ramallah, Rafah and Beit Jala and many other parts of the land of Islam [dar al-Islam], and we do not hear anyone raising his voice or reacting. But when the sword fell upon America after 80 years, hypocrisy raised its head up high bemoaning those killers who toyed with the blood, honor and sanctities of Muslims*(Anon., n.d.).

*The least that can be said about those hypocrites is that they are apostates who followed the wrong path. They backed the butcher against the victim, **the oppressor against the innocent child. I seek refuge in God against them and ask him to let us see them in what they deserve.** Every Muslim must rise to defend his religion. The wind of faith is blowing and the wind of change is blowing to remove evil from the Peninsula of Muhammad, peace be upon him. As to America, I say to it and its people a few words: **I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him.*** (Anon., n.d.)

God is the greatest and glory be to Islam”

It is evident that from the words of Bin Laden that he often tries to project US as an oppressor and provide a justification for their attack on WTC and Pentagon as a retaliatory measure to US involvement in the Middle East particularly in the Israel-Palestine issue, Iraq and their troops presence in Saudi Arabia. So with his powerful propaganda he strengthened Al-Qaeda by inspiring and drawing new members in the name of Salafi Jihadism he motivated them to fight against US in order to defend Islam and for the ultimate establishment of a global Caliphate based on stringent Sunni interpretation of Shariah law. This sense of priggish belief activates a continuous spread of automatic campaign of propagating the ideology among the members and followers of the Al-Qaeda.

In a terror organization like Al-Qaeda the structure of the organization is highly hierarchical with authoritarian attitude which helps the leaders to maintain its harmony and cohesion thereby providing the leaders legitimacy to do actions that ensure organizational sustainability and also to advance their personal aspirations by linking it with the organizational survivability. In the case of Al-Qaeda there were two characteristics which are distinct to the organization itself. At one end Al-Qaeda has a clear cut defined structure of command and control under the leadership of Bin Laden now under Ayman al-Zawahiri which is kind of rigid and unilateral in nature. At this hierarchical structure of command and control leader is always surrounded by the most trusted leaders and members of the organization as in case of Bin Laden who is surrounded by his most trusted henchman relishing the steady backing of Ayman al-Zawahiri who happens to be the personal physician for Bin Laden and also one of the key strategists next in line of command after Bin Laden. This rigid structure of Al-Qaeda is backed by nepotism in terms of appointment and recruitment at upper levels making it particularly at the leadership level to be virtually impenetrable. This feature of impenetrability has been trickled down till the base level that carry out tactics and acts and followed by each member in the terrorist cells which are secured through a stern discipline code specified by the training manual of Al-Qaeda (Gunaratna, n.d.). This manual stresses the prominence of security with particular chapters that emphasize on the individual safety, codes, investigation, cross-examination, ciphers, spying activities and an extensive thorough plan for security. Further it covers each characteristic of affair that varies from forgery of documents to evading compromise in equipments procurement. The impenetrable member network of Al-Qaeda along with the diligent obedience to the protocol laid out by the manual has helped it to develop and safeguard its extensive detailed plans of terrorist attacks though the members live among the societies they plan to attack (Brigitte L. Nacos, n.d.).

At the other end it also has a loose network of members who carry out communication and pass the information to guide the attack in addition to the propaganda of founding principles of the organization which is kind of flexible and intangible in nature. Apart from the hierarchical structure Al-Qaeda also has a council called the Shura Majlis that acts as a consultation platform which facilitates discussion among the members of executive board in laying out the policies and strategies for the organization. Four reports prepared by the committees that gives expert opinions on Combat, Finance, Media communications, Religion or legal issues would be submitted to the council. At this juncture the established twenty four representational sections would be wholly encompassed although their working functions are

segregated to safeguard the secrecy and security. This horizontal integration of groups which are loosely associated each with its independent structures of authority, management and communication adds flexibility to the organization which increases its interoperability thereby making it resilient(Gunaratna, n.d.).

REVENUE & LOGISTICS

The worldwide spread of Al-Qaeda network has its basis in Sudan where Bin Laden nurtured the organization between 1991 and 1996. Its devolved structure at the regional level helps the Al-Qaeda to use its regional sources and spaces to back up the operations increasing its feature of adaptability to the on-field events. Terrorist cells particularly in the form of sleeper cells penetrate the community of Muslims if required they would spend years to accumulate the finance, technical expertise and logistics to launch a terrorist attack. The initial establishment is supported by a group of surveillance and intelligence supplemented by a backup group that helps the finishing phases of arrangements. This faction constructs safe houses, supply ammunition, weapons and automobiles which helps the hit group to carry out their operation unrestrained. Further it also makes arrangements for travel by air which allows the transportation of the terrorists to the destined place capitalizing on the weak countries due to its shaky and fragile customary and immigration laws. This makes clear that identity hoax and illegitimate immigration constitutes the important tools of terrorism facilitated by forging the documentation of asylum, fraudulent passports and visas(Smith, n.d.).

The trained members of Al-Qaeda at the forefront base amalgamate into the mainstream society with a cover of running a legal business or organizations that provide relief for Muslims or indulge in organized crime with a low profile. In particular situations like during a highly ferocious fight the organizational members and fighters are paid considerable remuneration. Nevertheless, the core group of professionals functions in a congenial environment with a level of financial independence even managing the most aspired plans in an economical thrifty manner. For instance, in 9/11 attack Al-Qaeda showed a stringent control over their spending but making sure that the necessary equipment crucial to the attack were sufficiently financed. This makes the Al-Qaeda to successfully conduct the attack within the cost of less than half million dollars with the members giving back the unutilized money to their financial heads or investors in the final planning phases(Gunaratna, n.d.).

The inventive functional design and an enlarged extensive network backup helps Al-Qaeda to strike and sustain attacks across the world in certain instances accomplishing greater victory with their substantial investment. Despite the Al-Qaeda's efficient logistics procedure and its parasitical ability to exploit the resources of host country the organization yet need a monetary base to finance its actions. There is a committee for managing the financial activities in Al-Qaeda which is generally in charge of creating revenues for the Organization. Although Bin Laden's inherited personal assets of estimated three hundred million dollars acts as a financial base particularly at his initial stage in backing up mujahidin but eventually bin laden had got enough experience to utilize his funds more efficiently and effectively to build the organization through further generating various sources of revenues like individual personal donations from gulf countries, funds from Islam charity organizations, by indulging in global crime activities that fetch them good profit and also revenues generated from various commercial activities and possessions. From 2001 specifically after the launch of 'green quest' operation by treasury of US there were continuous efforts to track and segregate the funding sources of Al-Qaeda. Further counter-terrorism actions by French government had exposed the weakness in revenue raising and recruitment process of Al-Qaeda but its global diffusion of networks had made them tough to spot and disclose. It is estimated that over hundred and twenty million dollars of recognizable possessions were seized but it is believed that it only represents a small fragment of income and assets. Moreover, calculations by FBI reveal that Saudi Arabia had been the major source of revenue of close to hundred million dollars in the form of donations for Al-Qaeda and this has been further increased by enlarging the global network disguised in the name of Islamic charities worldwide specifically after 9/11 attacks. It also says that bin laden had owned the Sudan's most revenue generating businesses that varies from agriculture, civil construction to trading of currencies and exports during his time in Sudan until he was deported. This shows the level of financial experience and sophistication of the organization which even suspected to be involved in profitable dealings of derivative and stock markets of the world until the attack of World Trade Centre. Then the evolution of Internet had also exhibited the various ways to obtain the funds and other resources in an efficient manner which had made possible for the terror organization like Al-Qaeda to utilize it to promote and shift its resources. Further Al-Qaeda also generates income from indulging in crime which most of the reports mentions that kidnapping has been the major source of revenues that fetched almost close to 125 million US dollars from 2008. Thus pertaining to the Al-Qaeda's revenue source it is evident that

though initially it is entirely dependent on bin Laden's personal possessions it tends to diversify its revenue sources eventually not constraining itself to single sponsor or source particularly after the deportation of Bin Laden from Saudi Arabia and seizure of his personal assets in Saudi Arabia(Gunaratna, n.d.).

Although major chunk of Al-Qaeda's funds and resources are steered towards terror attacks it also allocate some part to its affiliates besides it also distributes to its terrorist cells proliferated throughout the world when the highly preferred strategic terror operations are executed. Further if a member of the organization is incarcerated or died in carrying out a terror attack it even provide considerable relief amount to the family of the terrorist. At the regional level cells are generally commanded to generate their own income through its low level crime activities like fraudulent and theft of credit cards and passports. As it is mentioned earlier direct support of funds are provided to the core cadre only when there is a high priority plan is in operation but these funds are separate from self-reliant convention. Thus the Al-Qaeda's strategy of finance complements the decentralized process of logistics thereby reducing the loopholes through which the organizational operation can be spotted and tracked. So, even though the collaborated and coordinated counter terrorism efforts of military action by west had destroyed the major base of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Sudan the civil officials find it difficult to segregate the established terrorist cells which continue to operate. Therefore, though Afghanistan has the base camp from a perspective of logistics and finance the network of decentralized terrorist cells had improved Al-Qaeda's capability to strike the west which contributed to its growth and success. Thus as Hoffman explains that the strength of Al-Qaeda is not connected to territorial claims or its assets in capital rather its flexible, fluid and transient functional behaviour makes it tough to speculate their actions thereby making it difficult for the countries to devise an effective counter policy. Further disconnected from the state funds and accumulating funds from various sources the organization has established its own position unrestrained by its sponsor's influence which paves the way for the organization to carry out its fight in abominable trend without the worry of isolating its sponsors from its operational plans.(Hoffman, n.d.)

PRESENT STATUS OF AL-QAEDA

Al-Qaeda has faced two major blows - its leader Bin Laden was killed by US navy seal military operation in 2011 and in the middle of 2014 the tremendous growth of ISIS with capturing territory and claiming global caliphate had eclipsed its dominance in jihadism. The

US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 attack had destroyed the base of Al-Qaeda as most of its members are captured or killed by US which resulted in world wide scatter of its senior leaders. After invasion of Iraq by US in 2003 Zarqawi led Al-Qaeda in Iraq had established itself as a powerful associate among the affiliates of Al-Qaeda. In 2006 Zarqawi was killed in a airstrike by US which made the fighters to scatter and retreat in 2007 which deteriorated the brand of Al-Qaeda globally. After that Al-Qaeda as a organization found it difficult to restore its stature and brand value. Then the Al-Qaeda had began to flex its branches in Arabian peninsula particularly in yemen with a more agile affiliate(Anon., n.d.).

After the death of bin laden , Ayman al-zawahiri a physician from egypt took the leadership of Al-Qaeda in 2011. When ISIS faced a series of setbacks from 2007-2011 in 2013 Al-Zawahiri tried to reaffirm the position of Al-Qaeda by publishing a general guidelines for Jihad which manifested a need for united Jihad and by exploiting the brutal actions of ISIS Al-Qaeda projected itself as a rational organization that uses violence in a confined manner- a narrative they propagate globally. At this juncture though zawahiri had a considerable success the focus point of the Al-Qaeda had began to switch to the Affiliated networks of Al-Qaeda. The affiliated networks propagate the ideology of Al-Qaeda without the burden of carrying the label of Al-Qaeda. Most of the key members of Al-Qaeda had went to syria from Afghanistan and pakistan to wage its war by utilizing the prevailing syrian conditions and its locational advantage close to west . A small faction had also moved to yemen where they built a more active group in arabian peninsula. In 2013 officials of US mentions that pakistan and afghanistan has only 50-100 core members of original Al-Qaeda which was inferred by the experts that Al-Qaeda as a organization had devolved into a decentralized networks of affiliates building formal and informal alliances in West asia, Asia and Africa. So , Al-Qaeda continues to pursue the strategy of gradual destabilization in stages focusing on the objectives of long term that could be achieved in a controlled practical way. This had made the Al-Qaeda to indulge in building its organizational strength through its alliances and support from locals across Syria , Iraq and other regions which shapes them a long term player in that conflicted region.It is said that various groups globally had worked in tandem with Al-Qaeda atleast once across different time frames at various levels. For instance, Nusra front established in 2012 in syria had become powerful among the Al-Qaeda's affiliates and one of the strongest rebel group operating in syria.By the middle of 2014 it is said that the affiliates of Al-Qaeda in syria had minimum 5000 members. Later in 2014 Nusra front was renamed as Jabhat Fateh al-sham and declared to have no connections with other outside organizations

although it shares the ideology and strategy of Al-Qaeda and still associated and collaborated with it. The ambitions of Al-Qaeda in Syria is not restricted only to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham as they continue to guide and influence other rebel militias like Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Fatah moniker thereby utilizing them to propagate and advertise their view of Jihadism. Thus they try to bring the jihadism eventually under the common banner of united jihad vision globally although not under one common organization (Anon., n.d.). By 2016 Al-Qaeda has recognized its 5 formal Affiliates that were operating in different regions of the world. These affiliates accept and follow the Al-Qaeda's central command under Zawahiri but adapt itself to the local conditions and tailor its strategy according to it. The major affiliates of Al-Qaeda are listed as follows

- **AQAP- Al-Qaeda in Arabic peninsula** with its major base in Yemen which was established in 2009 through the merge of Saudi Arabia and Yemen networks of Al-Qaeda that belong to the period of 1990s (Anon., n.d.).
- **AQIM- Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb**- operates in the Maghreb and Sahel region of North Africa. Initially established in 1998 as Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which pledged its affiliation to Al-Qaeda in 2006 (Anon., n.d.).
- **AQIS-Al-Qaeda in Indian Sub-continent**- operates in South Asian region. Established in 2014 through the merger of 11 jihadi groups in India, Afghanistan and Pakistan which had collaborated previously with Al-Qaeda since its inception (Anon., n.d.).
- **Al-Shabaab**- operates in East African region specifically in Somalia. Established in 2006 after its split from Islamic Courts Union guaranteed its loyalty and commitment to Al-Qaeda in 2009 and in 2012 Al-Qaeda formally acknowledged it as its Affiliate (Anon., n.d.).
- **JFS-Jabhat Fateh al-Sham**- operates in Syria. Initially in 2012 established as Jabhat Al-Nusra promised its commitment to Al-Qaeda in 2013 and in 2016 it was renamed as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham declaring that it ceased to operate as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda (Anon., n.d.).

CONCLUSION - POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Any country cannot counter terrorism and protect its priorities in any region by operating alone as both the human cost and material cost involved in combating terrorism is costly. From the 1980s, countering terrorism has increasingly dependent on global collaboration and alliances that includes both international and regional partners. As each country has its own precedences, strategies and political conditions to preserve their national interests it is pre-

requisite that the countries involved in alliances must be ready for compromises in order to build a common counterterrorism policy framework. Further in collaborating with a partner at local or regional level to engage with Al-Qaeda it is important that the local partners are legitimate political actors backed up by the support of people and military forces that are capable and committed to the country. For instance the experience of US from 2003 to 2011 in Iraq illustrates the threat of backing up a leader who segregates a certain section of society. In addition to that it also demonstrated that merely training and equipping the troops with arms does not guarantee a trusted and capable local ally.

So, in devising an effective and efficient policy to counter Al-Qaeda it is necessary to understand that the military actions can obstruct their operation but cannot demolish completely or undo the conditions which are born out of deep political discontent that paved the way for Al-Qaeda's growth and evolution. Failure to devise an inclusive counterterrorism policy that uses a combination of hard power and softpower will only lead to reemergence of Al-Qaeda or other terror organizations and reoccurrence of its problems. For example, after USSR withdraw its troops from Aghanistan in 1989 the international community had not done much to reconstruct war torn regions of Afghanistan which ultimately lead to the taliban's capture of power and providing shelter to Al-Qaeda. Likewise when the Al-Qaeda affiliates received serious setbacks due to US military action and sunni awakening revolt there were not much attention given to address problems and the resentment of Sunni community who were a minority in Iraq. So the negligence and inaction of both international coalition and Iraqi government has only led to the re-emergece of ISIS. Therefore any effective designing of Counter terrorism policy must include wide variety of policy options that are aimed at addressing political resolution, reconstruction, rehabiitation and deradicalization in addition to military measures because the use of hard power can damage Al-qaeda physically but to defang from its ideological strength it demands a extensive use of soft power in accumulating financial resources to rebuild the war torn areas and to design a variety of programmes to build the country's economy and to address its socio-economic issues like poverty, inequality, unemployment and youth bulge.

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